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The first quantum cryptography protocol, proposed by Bennett and Brassard in 1984 (BB84),
has been widely studied in the last years. This protocol uses four states (more precisely, two
complementary bases) for the encoding of the classical bit. Recently, it has been noticed that by
using the same four states, but a different encoding of information, one can define a new protocol
which is more robust in practical implementations, specifically when attenuated laser pulses are used
instead of single-photon sources [V. Scarani et al., Phys. Rev. Lett. 92, 057901 (2004); referred to
as SARG04]. We present a detailed study of SARG04 in two different regimes. In the first part,
we consider an implementation with a single-photon source: we derive bounds on the error rate
Q for security against all possible attacks by the eavesdropper. The lower and the upper bound
obtained for SARG04 (Q <∼ 10.95% and Q >∼ 14.9% respectively) are close to those obtained for
BB84 (Q <∼ 12.4% and Q >∼ 14.6% respectively). In the second part, we consider the realistic source
consisting of an attenuated laser and improve on previous analysis by allowing Alice to optimize the
mean number of photons as a function of the distance. SARG04 is found to perform better than
BB84, both in secret key rate and in maximal achievable distance, for a wide class of Eve’s attacks.
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum cryptography [1], or quantum key distribu-
tion (QKD), is the most mature field in quantum in-
formation, both in theoretical and in experimental ad-
vances. From the very beginning of quantum informa-
tion, it was clear that QKD should be secure because of
the no-cloning theorem, and also that it should be im-
plementable with available technology. However, both
rigorous proofs of security and truly practical implemen-
tations turned out to be serious challenges: one had to
start from the situations which are easiest to handle. But
what is ”easy” for a theorist (small number of parame-
ters, idealized components) is not what is ”easy” for an
experimentalist (practical, real components). Thence,
research in QKD mostly split into two fields: proving
security in theoretically idealized situations on the one
hand, and realizing practical prototypes on the other.
Important advances have been made in both direction; at
present, while many open problems remain in both fields,
an urgent task consists in bringing theory and applica-
tion together again. Indeed, the theoretical tools have
recently been applied to study the security of practical
implementations [2]. This paper aims at the same goal,
on a different protocol and with a different approach.
In any implementation of QKD, there is a large num-
ber of components which do not behave according to the
simplest theoretical model. Such is the source: QKD pro-
tocols based on photon counting are most easily studied
by assuming that a single-photon source or a source of
entangled photons is used; but by far the most practical
source is an attenuated laser [3]. This practical imple-
mentation can lead to secure QKD: the analysis of the
security parameters, while more complex than in the case
of single photons, is definitely important. A drawback
of the practical implementation was noticed by some au-
thors [4] and explicitly stated in 2000 by Lu¨tkenhaus and
co-workers [5]: weak laser pulses contain sometimes more
than one photon; thus, if losses are expected in the quan-
tum channel (as they always are), the eavesdropper, Eve,
may take advantage of the multi-photon pulses by keep-
ing some photons without introducing errors on those
that she lets pass. These attacks are known as photon-
number-splitting (PNS) attacks. Since then, several ways
have been found to counter PNS attacks. An especially
strong protection is obtained by introducing decoy states
[6]; this requires some modification of the experimental
devices. The idea behind the SARG04 protocol [7,8] is
different and complementary: one can keep the hardware
exactly as it is, but modify the classical communication
between Alice and Bob (the so-called ”sifting phase”).
Note that one can implement both the sifting of SARG04
and a monitoring using decoy states: this is the protocol
for which Tamaki and Lo have proved security for one-
and two-photon pulses [9].
The goal of this paper is to improve the comparison
between SARG04 and the original protocol of quantum
cryptography which uses four states, the one devised by
Bennett and Brassard in 1984, shortened as BB84 [10].
The structure of the paper is as follows:
• The protocol. In Section II, we recall the basics of
the SARG04 protocol and present its entanglement-
based version.
• Single-photon implementation. This is the content
of Section III. We compute a lower bound for se-
curity against all possible attacks of the eavesdrop-
per (in particular, the most general coherent at-
tacks) under one-way classical processing by Alice
and Bob — a study usually called ”unconditional
security”. The bound we obtain is Q <∼ 10.95%
where Q is the quantum bit error rate (QBER).
This bound is Q <∼ 12.4% for the BB84 protocol
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[11,12]. An upper bound for security can also be
computed by giving an explicit attack by Eve. We
identify an incoherent attack which performs better
than the one which uses the phase-covariant cloning
machine [13]. SARG04 is found to be certainly in-
secure in a single-photon implementation as soon
as Q >∼ 14.9%, the corresponding upper bounds for
BB84 being Q >∼ 14.64%.
Thus, the lower and upper bounds for security un-
der one-way classical postprocessing are similar for
both protocols. However, suppose that the channel
Alice-Bob is a depolarizing channel, as is the case
in all experiments performed to date:
E[|ψ〉] = F |ψ〉〈ψ| + D|ψ⊥〉〈ψ⊥| (1)
where F + D = 1. The channel is then charac-
terized by the disturbance D, or equivalently, by
the visibility V of the fringes one can observe in an
interferometric setup defined by
F =
1 + V
2
, D =
1− V
2
. (2)
Now, the link between the QBER and the visibility
is different for the two protocols: V = 1 − 2Q for
BB84, while V = 1−2Q1−Q for SARG04. The compar-
ison of the bound for the visibility is unfavorable
for SARG04.
• Attenuated laser pulses (Poissonian source), im-
perfect detectors. In Section IV, we consider the
more realistic situation for which SARG04 was de-
vised. Alice’s source is an attenuated laser, pro-
ducing weak pulses, that is, pulses with a mean
number of photons µ <∼ 1. A first comparison be-
tween SARG04 and BB84 in this implementation
can be found in the original references [7,8]. Here
we improve significantly on this analysis, although
the study of ultimate security is still beyond reach.
Anyway, for a broad class of incoherent attacks by
Eve including various forms of PNS [14], we can
compute the optimal secret key rate by optimiz-
ing over the mean number of photons µ describing
the Poissonian statistics. We work in the trusted-
device scenario: Eve cannot take advantage of the
limited efficiency or of the dark counts of Bob’s de-
tectors.
We find that the optimal mean number of photon
goes as µopt ∼ 2
√
t as a function of the transmission
t of the quantum channel, while the much smaller
value µopt ∼ t holds for BB84 under identical con-
ditions [15]. As a consequence, the secret key rate
(proportional to the detection rate µt) decreases as
t3/2 instead of the faster t2 decrease of BB84. The
limiting distance is also increased in SARG04 with
respect to BB84, approximately by 10km using typ-
ical values of the parameters of the detector and the
channel. Thus, SARG04 compares favorably with
BB84 in practical implementations for this class of
attacks.
The conclusions of both Sections III and IV strongly
suggest that the same quantum correlations can be ex-
ploited differently according to the physical realization,
by adapting the classical encoding and decoding proce-
dures.
II. SARG04
A. SARG04: prepare-and-measure version
The SARG04 was introduced in Ref. [7] in a prepare-
and-measure version. At the level of quantum processing,
it is exactly equivalent to BB84. Alice prepares one of
the four states belonging to two conjugated bases, e.g.
|+ z〉 ≡ |0〉, | − z〉 ≡ |1〉, |+ x〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉 + |1〉) and
| − x〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉 − |1〉). She sends the state to Bob, who
measures either σz or σx. The difference with BB84 ap-
pears in the encoding and decoding of classical informa-
tion. The classical bit is encoded in the basis: |+ z〉 and
| − z〉 code for ”0”, |+ x〉 and | − x〉 code for ”1”. Since
each basis codes for a bit, it is natural in SARG04 to ad-
mit that the two bases are chosen randomly with equal
probability [16].
In the sifting phase, Alice does not reveal the ba-
sis (this would reveal the bit): she discloses the state
she has sent and one of the states which code for the
other value of the bit, which are not orthogonal to the
first one. There are thus a priori four sifting sets:
S++ = {|+ z〉, |+ x〉}, S−− = {| − z〉, | − x〉}, S+− =
{|+ z〉, | − x〉} and S−+ = {| − z〉, |+ x〉}. For definite-
ness, suppose |sent〉 = |+ z〉 and |declared〉 = |+ x〉:
Bob guesses correctly the bit if he measured σx and found
|right〉 = | − x〉; he guesses wrongly the bit if he mea-
sured σz and found |wrong〉 = | − z〉. As usual, an error
can only happen if the state has been modified by an
eavesdropper, or in the presence of dark counts. In the
absence of errors, the length of the sifted key is 14 of the
length of the raw key; in the presence of an error rate Q,
this length increases.
This encoding is better to protect secrecy against in-
coherent PNS attacks when the source is not a single-
photon source. In fact, suppose that a pulse contained
two photons and Eve has kept one of them in a quantum
memory. In BB84, by listening to the sifting, Eve learns
the basis: she can measure the photon she has kept and
learn the bit with certainty. In SARG04, in the sifting
Eve learns that the state is either of two non-orthogonal
states: she cannot learn the bit with certainty. In or-
der to learn the bit with certainty without introducing
errors, Eve has to implement an unambiguous state dis-
crimination on the three-photon pulses, which succeeds
with probability 12 . This suggests that SARG04 should
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be more robust than BB84 against incoherent PNS at-
tacks. In Refs [7,8] it was shown that this intuitive rea-
soning is correct and gives a real advantage over BB84;
we shall confirm this conclusion with a significantly im-
proved analysis in Section IV.
B. SARG04: entanglement-based version
In order to determine a lower bound on the secret key
rate we will consider the equivalent entanglement–based
version of the SARG04 protocol [17,9]. To this end we
define the encoding operators
Aσω = |0〉〈σz|+ |1〉〈ωx| (3)
where σ, ω = ±1. Instead of preparing a state and send-
ing the qubit to Bob, Alice prepares randomly one of the
states
Aσω ⊗ 1 |Φ+〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉|σz〉+ |1〉|ωx〉) (4)
and sends the second qubit to Bob. Measuring Alice’s
qubit then in the computational basis {|0〉, |1〉} prepares
Bob’s qubit in one of the four states used by the proto-
col. In order to decode the information sent by Alice,
Bob applies one of the four operators
Bσω =
1√
2
[
σ |0〉〈−ωx|+ ω |1〉〈−σz|] . (5)
After that, Bob measures his qubit in the computational
basis.
Let us show that this description is indeed equivalent
to the prepare-and-measure protocol described above.
The preparation by Alice is equivalent since a measure-
ment in the z–basis performed on the first qubit described
by one of the states Aσω⊗1 |Φ+〉 leads with equal proba-
bility to one of the states |σz〉, |ωx〉. On the other hand,
Bob’s measurement is
B†σω|0〉〈0|Bσω = 12 | − ωx〉〈−ωx|
B†σω|1〉〈1|Bσω = 12 | − σz〉〈−σz|
(6)
where σ, ω = ±. Thus, his measurement corresponds to
measuring his qubit either in the z, or x–basis [18].
We dispose now of all the tools to tackle the security
studies on the SARG04 protocol. As announced, we con-
sider first the case of single-photon sources and will tackle
the more realistic case of attenuated lasers in Section IV.
III. SINGLE-PHOTON SOURCES
A. Generalities: the scenario for security proofs
In this section we investigate the security of the
SARG04 protocol, assuming that Alice is sending out sin-
gle photons encoding the bit values. First of all, we com-
pute a lower bound on the secret key rate using the results
presented in [11,12]. Then we compare those bounds to
the bounds derived with proofs based on entanglement
distillation [9]. After that we determine an upper bound
on the secret key rate for the SARG04 protocol. To this
aim we explicitly construct an attack by Eve. This attack
is incoherent, i.e. acting on each qubit individually and
measuring each qubit right after the basis reconciliation.
B. Lower bound on the secret key rate
1. Review of the approach
Let us start by summarizing the results presented in
[11,12], where a computable lower bound on the secret
key rate for a general class of QKD protocols using one–
way classical post–processing has been derived. We use
the entanglement–based description of the protocol. Al-
ice prepares n qubit–pairs at random in one of the states
defined in Eq. (4) and sends the second qubit of each pair
to Bob. Eve might now apply the most general attack
on all the qubits sent to Bob. Bob applies at random
one of the operators defined in Eq. (5) on the qubits
he received. After that Alice and Bob symmetrize their
qubit pairs by applying a random permutation on them.
On the other hand, Alice and Bob randomly choose for
each qubit pair to apply the bit flip operation (σx ⊗ σx).
Both of those transformations commute with their mea-
surement in the z–basis. It has been shown in [11] that
after randomly applying these transformation the form
of the state describing Alice’s and Bob’s system is Bell-
diagonal, independently of the protocol. Its eigenbasis
is given by {|Φ+〉⊗n1 |Φ−〉⊗n2 |Ψ+〉⊗n3 |Ψ−〉⊗n4}, where
n1+n2+n3+n4 = n and the states |Φ±〉, |Ψ±〉 denote the
Bellbasis. Apart from that the state is symmetric with
respect to exchanging the different qubit–pairs. The only
free parameters are the eigenvalues of the density oper-
ator. Those depend on the distribution of the quantum
information, i.e. on the QKD protocol. It is important to
note that when assuming that Eve has a purification of
this state, i.e ρABE = |Ψ〉ABE〈Ψ|, for some state |Ψ〉ABE ,
then her power is never underestimated. It has then be
shown in [11,12] that a lower bound on the secret key
rate can then be determined considering only two–qubit
density operators. In particular, for a given QBER, Q,
a lower bound on the secret key rate (assuming that Al-
ice and Bob apply optimal error correction and privacy
amplification) is given by
r ≥ r1 = sup
A′←A
inf
σAB∈ΓQ
R(σA′BE) (7)
with
R(σA′BE) =
[
S(σA′E)− S(σE)
] − H(A′|B) . (8)
Here, S (H) denotes the von Neumann (Shannon) en-
tropy respectively. It is important to take some space to
describe these objects in detail.
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• The first apparent thing is that Alice does some-
thing to her bit string A which transforms them to
A′. This is called preprocessing. It is a classical
operation, known only to her (just note that in the
original formula, Eq. (2) in [11], there appears also
the possibility, noted V there, that Alice discloses
something of her preprocessing publicly: neglect-
ing this possibility here, we can nevertheless obtain
a lower bound). We consider here that Alice ap-
plies this preprocessing to each bit value indepen-
dently. Thus, she can only flip her bit values with
a certain probability. Note that this transforma-
tion reduces the information Bob has about Alice’s
bit string, but it turns out that it penalizes Eve
more than Bob, which implies that this preprocess-
ing increases the secret key rate. Obviously, Alice
will choose the preprocessing which maximizes the
rate, whence the ”supremum” in (7).
• The set ΓQ can be assumed to contain only two–
qubit Bell–diagonal density operators which are
compatible with the measured QBER Q. In or-
der to be more precise we have to introduce
the following notation. We denote by ρ0 =
trE[E(|Φ+〉AB〈Φ+| ⊗ |0〉E〈0|)], where E denotes a
general map applied by Eve (we do not impose that
this map is unitary, since we are going to consider
in the following the state shared by Alice and Bob
after sifting). Let us denote now by Aj , Bj the
decoding/encoding operators defined by the con-
sidered protocol. For the SARG04 protocol, these
are the operators defined in Eq. (3) and Eq. (5), re-
spectively. The state describing Alice’s and Bob’s
qubit pairs after sifting can be considered to be
ρ1 = D1(ρ0) = C
∑
j
Aj ⊗Bj ρ0A†j ⊗B†j (9)
where C is a normalization constant which may de-
pend on ρ0 (recall that e.g. in SARG04, the length
of the sifted key varies with the amount of errors).
Recall that this state is measured by Alice and Bob
in the z–basis. Using this notation we can now de-
fine the set ΓQ. It contains any state of the form
ρ2 = λ1PΦ+ + λ2PΦ− + λ3PΨ+ + λ4PΨ− (10)
with
λ1 = 〈Φ+|ρ1|Φ+〉
λ2 = 〈Φ−|ρ1|Φ−〉
λ3 = 〈Ψ+|ρ1|Ψ+〉
λ4 = 〈Ψ−|ρ1|Ψ−〉
. (11)
Those coefficients have to fulfill the normalization
condition and the fact that the state ρ2 has to be
compatible with the estimated error, Q. Since the
state is measured in the computational basis this
implies
λ1 + λ2 = 1−Q ,
λ3 + λ4 = Q .
(12)
The considered protocol, i.e. the map D1 confines
the λ’s further. Let us denote now by σAB ∈ ΓQ
the state describing Alice’s and Bob’s qubit. Eve
is supposed to hold a purification of this state, i.e
σABE is pure. Obviously, one must suppose that
Eve has made the best attack, whence the ”infi-
mum” in Eq (7).
• The density matrix σA′E is the state of the joint
system of Alice and Eve, after Alice has performed
the preprocessing.
• As for R(σA′BE): if one would replace the von
Neumann entropy S by the Shannon entropy H ,
this boils down to H(A′|E) − H(A′|B) = I(A′ :
B) − I(A′ : E), giving the usual Csisza´r-Ko¨rner
bound [19], see Eq. (29) below. What appears in
Eq. (7) is thus its ”quantum analog”, given that
Eve is allowed to keep her systems quantum.
Now, we have announced that one can compute a lower
bound on the secret key rate considering only two–qubit
Bell–diagonal states. Precisely, this is true if Alice’s pre-
processing is bit-wise. In general, it holds that: if Alice’s
preprocessing is applied to strings of n bits, then one can
restrict to Eve’s collective attacks on n pairs. If we note
rn the corresponding bound for the secret key rate r, one
has r ≥ rn ≥ r1; it is an open problem, whether strict
inequalities hold.
In summary, we are going to compute the lower bound
on the secret key rate if Alice applies a bit-wise prepro-
cessing, i.e. Eq. (7). The quantity R(σA′BE) is given
in Appendix A as an explicit function of the λi. This
expression is independent of the protocol: as mentioned
above, only the constraints on the λi, that is the set ΓQ,
depend on the protocol. Possible improvements on the
bound may come from more-than-one-bit preprocessing,
and/or from revealing a part of the preprocessing pub-
licly.
2. Lower bound for SARG04
The SARG04 protocol uses all the four sifting sets Sσω
(a different bound is found if one considers a modified
protocol which uses only two sets, see Appendix B). One
finds after some algebra
λ1 = C 〈Φ+|ρ0|Φ+〉
λ2 = C
[〈Ψ−|ρ0|Ψ−〉+ 〈Φ−|ρ0|Φ−〉+ 〈Ψ+|ρ0|Ψ+〉]
λ3 =
C
2
[〈Φ−|ρ0|Φ−〉+ 〈Ψ+|ρ0|Ψ+〉]
λ4 =
C
2
[
4〈Ψ−|ρ0|Ψ−〉+ 〈Φ−|ρ0|Φ−〉+ 〈Ψ+|ρ0|Ψ+〉
] (13)
The following relations then hold:
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λ4 + 3λ3 = 2λ2 (14)
λ4 ≥ λ3 . (15)
Supposing that we leave λ2 = x free, we obtain λ1 =
1−Q− x from (12), λ3 = x− Q2 and λ4 = 3Q2 − x from
(14); the positivity of λ3 and (15) restrain x to lie in
the range [Q/2, Q]. We optimize r1 and find it positive
provided Q ≤ 10.95%. If we’d have neglected the pre-
processing, we’d have found Q ≤ 9.68%, the same value
obtained by Tamaki and Lo [9,20].
C. Singe photon: Upper bound — A new incoherent
attack
As we noticed at the end of III B 1, the bounds we
have just obtained may be subject to some future im-
provement when more complex preprocessing strategies
are taken into account. In the meantime, we can easily
derive an upper bound by computing explicitly a possible
attack by Eve. We consider an incoherent attack, that is
an attack consisting of (i) a unitary operation U coupling
the qubit flying to Bob to Eve’s systems; (ii) a suitable
measurement on Eve’s systems, after hearing the result
of the sifting but before any other classical processing
(this is the difference with collective attacks).
Even within the class of incoherent attacks, the full
optimization is a hard task. The problem is not really
at the level of the unitary U . In fact, since both Alice’s
and Bob’s system are qubits, Eve’s ancilla may be taken
without restriction to be four-dimensional. Thus, the ac-
tion of the unitary on states of the form |ψ〉A|R〉E can
be specified by only sixteen parameters, not all indepen-
dent — apart from the requirement of unitarity, we have
imposed a symmetry on the set of states, namely that
U realizes a depolarizing channel (1) between Alice and
Bob with the same D for |ψ〉 belonging to the x or to
the z−basis. In summary, the unitary is defined by a
number of parameters which is small (at least for numer-
ical optimization). What is not known at all a priori,
is the kind of measurement Eve has to perform on her
system, which would give her the best information on
Alice’s and Bob’s bits. Here, we choose a specific kind
of measurement that can be defined for any U (Helstrom
measurement, see below) and optimize the parameters of
U in order to maximize Eve’s information in such a mea-
surement. The best U found with this method is not the
phase-covariant cloning machine, i.e. the cloner which
copies all the states of the x and the z−bases with the
same fidelity [13].
This result is interesting in itself because it shows that
cryptography and cloning are clearly different tasks. In
fact, the ”states to be copied” are the same ones in
SARG04 as in BB84, so the optimal cloner is the phase-
covariant cloning machine in both cases. It turns out this
cloner enters also the construction of the optimal inco-
herent eavesdropping for BB84; for SARG04 however it
is not the case. The cause of the difference is clear: in
optimal cloning, one wants to optimize the fidelity of the
output states to the input state; in optimal incoherent
eavesdropping, one wants to optimize Eve’s information,
and this is a priori a completely different problem.
1. Eve’s unitary operation
We start by describing the unitary U which we have
found. It is defined by its action on the z–basis of the
qubit flying from Alice to Bob and on a reference state
used by Eve as:
U|σz〉A|R〉E =
√
F |σz〉B |0〉E1 |ψσ(D)〉E2
+
√
D | − σz〉B|1〉E1 |0〉E2 (16)
with σ = ± and |ψσ(D)〉 =
√
1−D/F |0〉+ σ
√
D/F |1〉.
Here, D ∈ [0, 12] is the only free parameter of the trans-
formation. Note that Eve’s system is only 3-dimensional;
we used a two-qubit notation for convenience. In fact,
with this notation, the action of the unitary in the x–
basis is similar to its action on the z–basis, but the roles
of E1 and E2 are reversed: writing with ω = ±, one has
U|ωx〉A|R〉E =
√
F |ωx〉B |ψω(D)〉E1 |0〉E2
+
√
D | − ωx〉B|0〉E1 |1〉E2 . (17)
We suppose in the following that Alice publicly an-
nounces the set {|+ z〉, |+ x〉} (i.e. Alice actually sends
one of these two states), and that Bob accepts the bit.
It has been verified that thanks to the symmetries of the
attack, all the following still holds if Alice sends another
state and/or announces another set.
Bob’s states: Suppose for definiteness that Alice sends
the state |+ z〉. If we trace over Eve’s system, we get
Bob’s state :
ρ+zB = F |+ z〉〈+z|+D| − z〉〈−z|. (18)
Thus the effective channel induced on Alice-Bob by Eve’s
attack is a depolarizing channel (1) with disturbance D.
If Bob measures his qubit in the z basis, then he will ac-
cept the (wrong) conclusive result | − z〉 with probability
p zacc = D. If Bob now measures his qubit in the x basis,
he will accept the (right) conclusive result | − x〉 with
probability pxacc = 〈−x|ρB| − x〉 = 1/2. The quantum
bit error rate after sifting (QBER) is therefore:
Q =
p zacc
p zacc + p
x
acc
=
D
1/2 +D
. (19)
Note that, contrary to the case of BB84, Q 6= D; for
small values of D we have actually Q ≃ 2D. We shall
come back to this point in the comparison with BB84,
paragraph IIID below.
Eve’s states: After sifting, Eve has to distinguish
between four states, corresponding to the two possible
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states announced by Alice and the two cases in which
Bob accepts the item. We write these states as |ψ˜abE 〉,
where a (resp. b) ∈ {0, 1} denote Alice’s (resp. Bob’s)
classical bit:
|ψ˜00E 〉 = B〈−x|U|+ z〉|R〉
=
1√
2
(√
1− 2D|00〉+
√
2D|Ψ−〉) (20)
|ψ˜01E 〉 = B〈−z|U|+ z〉|R〉 =
√
D|10〉 (21)
|ψ˜10E 〉 = B〈−x|U|+ x〉|R〉 =
√
D|01〉 (22)
|ψ˜11E 〉 = B〈−z|U|+ x〉|R〉
=
1√
2
(√
1− 2D|00〉 −
√
2D|Ψ−〉) (23)
with |Ψ−〉 = 1√
2
(|01〉 − |10〉). Note that these states are
not normalized, but the square of their norms correspond
to the probabilities with which they appear. Eve should
now distinguish at best between these four states.
2. Eve’s measurement: Helstrom strategy
We suppose that Eve uses the Helstrom strategy to
guess Alice’s bit [21]. This strategy, which may not be
the optimal one for the present problem, consists in mea-
suring the observable
MA = ρ
A=0
E − ρA=1E (24)
where
ρA=jE =
1
1
2 +D
(
|ψ˜j0E 〉〈ψ˜j0E |+ |ψ˜j1E 〉〈ψ˜j1E |
)
. (25)
Some analytical results, which provide also a different
perspective on Helstrom’s strategy, are given in Ap-
pendix C. Here we just sketch the calculation that can
also be implemented numerically from the beginning.
There are three possible outcomes e for Eve’s variable
E. The probability of each outcome is
pE=e = 〈me|ρE |me〉 (26)
with ρE =
1
2ρ
A=0
E +
1
2ρ
A=1
E . The information Eve gets on
Alice’s bit is
I(A : E) = H(A)−H(A|E) = 1−
∑
e
pE=eH(A|E=e)
= 1−
∑
e
pE=eh(pA=0|E=e) (27)
where h is binary entropy and where
pA=0|E=e = pA=0
pE=e|A=0
pE=e
=
1
2
pE=e|A=0
pE=e
(28)
with pE=e|A=0 = 〈me|ρA=0E |me〉. This information is
plotted together with Bob’s information I(A : B) =
1− h(Q) as a function of the QBER, Eq. (19), in Fig. 1.
The curve of I(A : E) for the attack using the phase-
covariant cloning machine, taken from Ref. [8], is in-
cluded for comparison. Our attack is slightly more ef-
ficient in the interesting region.
Actually, if Eve performs the measurement ofMA, she
has a good guess on Alice’s bit but a very poor infor-
mation on Bob’s bit (the only thing she knows is that
Bob’s bit is equal to Alice’s with probability 1 − D).
Similarly, with reversed roles, if Eve would measure
MB = ρ
B=0
E − ρB=1E : numerically, the I(B : E) so found
is equal to I(A : E) found when measuringMA; but now,
Eve has poor information on Alice’s bit. For BB84 and
the six-state protocols, measurements have been explic-
itly found which attain the optimal value for both Alice’s
and Bob’s bits. We did not find such a measurement
here. However, this is not important: before starting er-
ror correction and privacy amplification, Alice and Bob
must choose whether to perform the direct or the reverse
reconciliation; thus Eve can simply choose the suitable
measurement.
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FIG. 1. Bob’s and Eve’s information on Alice’s bit (before
her possible preprocessing) for our individual attack and the
attack using the phase-covariant (PC) cloning machine.
3. Bound on the secret-key rate
An upper bound on the attainable secret key rate us-
ing one-way communication and single-bit preprocessing
is given by the Csiszar-Ko¨rner bound [19] which reads
r ≤ Rsk = max
A′←A
{I(A′ : B)− I(A′ : E)} (29)
where A′ is the result of a local processing of Alice’s vari-
ables. The need for this maximization went unnoticed in
the field of QKD until very recently [11], but is indeed
present in the original paper. Here, we consider the case
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when the process A→ A′ consists in Alice’s flipping her
bit with some probability q. Bob’s information is now
I(A′ : B) = 1− h(Q′) (30)
where
Q′ = (1− q)Q+ q(1−Q) . (31)
As for Eve’s information, it can be calculated with
Eq. (27) upon changing pA=0|E=e to
pA′=0|E=e = (1− q)pA=0|E=e + qpA=1|E=e . (32)
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FIG. 2. Upper graph: upper bound Rsk on the secret key
rate obtained with the attack under study with (solid lines)
and without (dotted lines) Alice’s optimal preprocessing, as a
function of the QBER. Lower graph: corresponding value of
the optimal q. The preprocessing slightly increases the bound
where the achievable secret key rate becomes 0 (which we find
to be 14.9%).
Fig. 2 displays the upper bound on the secret key rate,
Eq. (29), with and without Alice’s bit flipping (upper
graph) and the corresponding optimal value of q (lower
graph) as a function of the QBER. We can see that this
preprocessing allows Alice and Bob to slightly increase
the bound on the QBER where the achievable secret key
rate becomes zero. In the case where Alice performs
bit-wise preprocessing as we consider here, this bound is
14.9%. Alice will do this preprocessing only for a QBER
close to the bound of 14.9%, with q increasing as the
QBER increases. At the bound, q = 0.5: Alice flips half
of her bits, so that both Bob’s and Eve’s information
on her bits is completely randomized. After this opti-
mal preprocessing, Fig. 1 would look as follows: both
I(A : B) and I(A : E) stay the same up to Q ≈ 14.6%;
then suddenly both drop rapidly to zero, with their dif-
ference given in the upper graph of Fig. 2.
No preprocessing was taken into account in Ref. [8] for
the attack using the phase-covariant cloner. When one
includes bit-wise preprocessing, the bound for that at-
tack moves from 15.03% to 15.12%. Consequently, the
attack presented here is still more efficient from Eve’s
standpoint.
D. Single-photon: Comparison with BB84
In the previous paragraphs, we have provided lower
and upper bounds for the security of SARG04 in a single-
photon implementation, under the assumptions of one-
way classical processing and bit-wise preprocessing on
Alice’s side. The corresponding bounds for BB84 are
known from Refs [11,12]. The results are:
lower: extract a key if
BB84: Q <∼ 12.4%
SARG04: Q <∼ 10.95%
; (33)
upper: abort if
BB84: Q >∼ 14.6%
SARG04: Q >∼ 14.9%
(34)
Looked that way, SARG04 compares almost on equal
ground with BB84 in a single-photon implementation.
Experimentalists would however have a different look.
Consider for a moment a detector with no dark counts,
or more realistically, a situation in which the number
of dark counts is negligible compared with the detection
rate. In all practical experiments to date, the noise is
such that the effective channel E between Alice and Bob
becomes a depolarizing channel (1) characterized by its
visibility V .
In BB84, for such a channel, the error rate on the sifted
key is independent of the state |ψ〉: in fact, when the good
basis has been chosen, one has simply pright =
1+V
2 and
pwrong =
1−V
2 . Consequently
Q =
pwrong
pright + pwrong
BB84
=
1− V
2
. (35)
In SARG04, the situation is different. If Bob chooses the
good decoding basis (which is not the basis in which the
qubit was encoded), then whenever he accepts, he guesses
always right, and this happens with probability pright =
1
2 independently of V . If Bob chooses the wrong decod-
ing basis and accepts, then he always guesses wrongly;
and this happens with probability pwrong =
1−V
2 . Thus
Q =
pwrong
pright + pwrong
SARG04
=
1− V
2− V ≈ 1− V . (36)
Note that we have already derived this formula above,
Eq. (19) with D = 1−V2 . For a fixed visibility, the QBER
of SARG04 is almost twice the QBER of BB84. In this
sense, the bounds of SARG04 compare unfavorably to
BB84 in a single-photon implementation [22].
IV. PRACTICAL IMPLEMENTATION
As we stressed in the Introduction, it has not yet been
possible to give the most general security criteria with-
out adding assumptions about some simplified compo-
nents. While theory progresses, experimentalists need
realistic figures to design their experiments and to evalu-
ate their results. These figures must take into account all
the meaningful parameters characterizing Alice’s source,
the line (”quantum channel”) linking Alice to Bob, and
Bob’s detectors.
To compute these figures, we have to make several as-
sumptions, which will be stated precisely in what follows,
but in general fall into two categories:
• We restrict the class of Eve’s attacks, taking into
account only incoherent attacks, among which the
PNS and its variants play the most important role.
This assumption leads to an underestimate of Eve’s
power.
• We also have to specify the kind of check that Al-
ice and Bob perform on their data. Apart from the
estimate of the QBER, Alice and Bob can check
the transmission of the line and more precisely the
statistics of the number of photons.
The Section is structured as follows. First, we describe
the source, the line and the detectors (IVA), the ex-
pected parameters in the absence of Eve (IVB) and the
hypotheses on Eve’s attack (IVC). Then, we present the
results of numerical optimizations (IVD); in the case of
perfect optical visibility V = 1, we provide also approx-
imate analytical formulae. The last subsection (IVE) is
devoted to a balance of the results obtained for SARG04,
in comparison with BB84.
A. Description of the source, the line and the
detectors
Alice’s source: Alice encodes her classical bits in light
pulses; since a reference for the phase is not available to
Eve and to Bob, the effective state prepared by Alice is
a mixture which is diagonal in the photon-number basis:
ρA =
∞∑
n=0
pA(n) |nψ〉〈nψ| (37)
where |nψ〉 represents the state in which n photons are
present in the state |ψ〉. In most practical QKD setups,
Alice’s source is an attenuated laser pulse, so
pA(n) = p(n|µ) = e−µ µ
n
n!
(38)
the Poissonian distribution of mean photon number µ.
In this paper, the formulae where the notation pA(n) (or
pB(n), see below) appears explicitly are general, all the
others suppose (38) to hold.
Alice-Bob quantum channel: The quantum channel
which connects Alice and Bob is characterized by the
losses α, usually given in dB/km (for optical fibers at
the telecom wavelength 1550nm, the typical value is
α ≃ 0.25dB/km). The transmission of the line at a dis-
tance d is therefore
t = 10−αd/10 . (39)
The probability that Bob receives n photons is
pB(n) =
∑
m≥n
pA(m)C
n
mt
n(1 − t)m−n (38)= p(n|µt) (40)
where Cnm =
m!
n!(m−n)! . The other meaningful parameter
of the channel is the fidelity of the transmission F (or
the disturbance D = 1 − F ). We assume a depolarizing
channel (1):
E[|+ z〉] = F |+ z〉〈+z| + D| − z〉〈−z| (41)
=
1
2
|+ x〉〈+x| + 1
2
| − x〉〈−x|+ off-diag. (42)
and recall the link (2) between the parameters F and D,
and the visibility V .
Bob’s detectors: Bob uses single-photon counters with
a limited quantum efficiency η and a probability of dark
count per gate pd. For simplicity of writing, in some
intermediate formulae we shall write η¯ = 1 − η and
p¯d = 1− pd. The gate here means that Bob knows when
a pulse sent by Alice is supposed to arrive, and opens
his detectors only at those times; so here, “per [Bob’s]
gate” and “per [Alice’s] pulse” are equivalent. Typical
values nowadays are η ≃ 0.1 and pd ∼ 10−5 − 10−6 for
the detection of photons at telecom wavelengths.
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B. Bob’s detection and error rates
Bob receives n photons with probability pB(n) given
in (40). We want to compute his detection and his error
rate. For definiteness, we suppose from now on that Alice
sends |sent〉 = |+ z〉, and publicly declares this state and
|declared〉 = |+ x〉. Bob guesses correctly if he measures
in the x basis and finds |ok〉 = | − x〉, he guesses wrongly
if he measures in the z basis and finds |wrong〉 = | − z〉.
Among the peculiarities of SARG04 which must be dis-
cussed, is the role of double clicks. In BB84, when both
detectors click, the item is discarded: in fact, a double
click can appear only if (i) Bob has received and detected
two photons, in the wrong basis, or (ii) Bob has detected
just one photon but has had a dark count in the other
detector; in both cases, there is no way to tell the value
of the bit sent by Alice. In SARG04, things are different
because Bob guesses correctly the bit when he measures
in the ”physically wrong” basis (basis x with our con-
vention). A double click may mean precisely that the
basis chosen by Bob is not the one chosen by Alice, and
this gives the information on the bit. But the dark count
case is still there, and introduces errors. In this paper, for
simplicity we suppose that items with double clicks are
discarded from the key, as in BB84; however, their rate
is monitored, to prevent Eve from achieving an effective
modification of η, see IVC.
1. Zero-click rate
When n photons arrive, the probability of not having
any click is independent of the basis chosen by Bob and
is given by
p0(n) = (1− pd)2(1− η)n . (43)
The corresponding zero-click rate is C0 =∑
n≥0 pB(n)p0(n) = (1 − pd)2 p(0|µtη) i.e. there are
no dark counts and no photon is detected.
2. Sifted key and QBER
The accepted-click rate on Bob’s side is the sum of two
terms. When Bob measures in the z basis, he accepts
the (wrong) bit if there is one click in the | − z〉 detector
(whether it is due to a photon or to a dark count), and no
click in the |+ z〉 detector. When n photons arrive, the
probability of having a click only on the | − z〉 detector
is
p zacc(n, V ) =
n∑
k=0
CknF
kDn−k
[
p¯dη¯
k
] [
1− p¯dη¯n−k
]
= (1− pd) [(1− Fη)n − (1 − pd)(1 − η)n] , (44)
with Ckn =
n!
k!(n−k)! . The accepted-click rate in the z ba-
sis is then C zacc(V ) =
∑
n≥0 pB(n) p
z
acc(n, V ); using some
standard calculation [23], we obtain for a Poissonian dis-
tribution
C zacc(V ) = (1 − pd)
[
p(0|Fµtη)− (1 − pd)p(0|µtη)
]
. (45)
In the limit µtη ≪ 1 (and pd ≪ 1, which is always the
case), one finds C zacc(V ) ≈ Dµtη + pd. We highlighted
the dependance of these quantities on V because it will
be important for what follows.
When Bob now measures in the x basis, he accepts the
(right) bit if he gets a click on the | − x〉 detector, and
no click on the |+ x〉 detector. Because of (42), we just
have to change F to 12 in the previous formulae:
pxacc(n) = (1− pd)
[
(1− η/2)n − (1− pd)(1− η)n
]
, (46)
so that for Poissonian sources C xacc = (1 −
pd)
[
p(0|µtη/2) − (1 − pd)p(0|µtη)
] ≈ 12 µtη + pd. Since
the two bases are randomly chosen, the global probability
for Bob to accept a click is
pacc(n, V ) =
1
2
pxacc(n) +
1
2
p zacc(n, V ) , (47)
and the accepted-click rate on Bob’s side (i.e. the length
of the sifted key) is
Cacc(V ) =
1
2
C xacc +
1
2
C zacc(V ) . (48)
All the items C xacc being correct and all the items C
z
acc(V )
being wrong, the QBER is
Q =
1
2C
z
acc(V )
Cacc(V )
. (49)
For pd ≪ µtη ≪ 1 and D << 12 , we find
Q ≈ 2D + 2 pd
µtη
≡ Qopt +Qdet , (50)
Cacc(V ) ≈ 1
4
µtη
(
1 +Qopt + 2Qdet
)
(51)
As expected, the sifted-key rate increases in the pres-
ence of errors. Note also that the QBER is twice the
one expected for BB84, for the same parameters: now,
µ is going to be larger for SARG04 than it is for BB84,
so that Qdet is not really larger; however, D is fixed by
the visibility: SARG04 is thus more sensitive to losses of
visibility than BB84 is.
Finally, allowing for Alice’s preprocessing, the mutual
information between Alice and Bob is
I(A′ : B) = Cacc(V ) (1− h(Q′)) (52)
with Q′ related to Q (49) as in Eq. (31).
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3. Double-click rate
The calculation of the double-click rates C x,z2 is sim-
ilar to the one of C x,zacc . For each basis, it holds C
x,z
2 =∑
n≥2 pB(n) p
x,z
2 (n) where p
x,z
2 (n) is the probability of a
double click conditioned on the fact that exactly n pho-
tons reach Bob. Consider first the z basis: one has to
modify (44) in order to describe a click in both detectors,
so we have to replace
[
p¯dη¯
k
]
with
[
1− p¯dη¯k
]
. Thence
p z2 (n, V ) = 1− (1− pd)[(1− Fη)n + (1 −Dη)n]
+(1− pd)2(1− η)n . (53)
The double-click probability in the x basis is obtained by
replacing both F and D by 12 ; by comparison with (43)
and (46), one finds
px2 (n) = 1− p0(n)− 2pxacc(n) . (54)
For Poissonian sources, this yields [23]
C z2 (V ) = 1− (1− pd)[p(0|µtηF ) + p(0|µtηD)]
+(1− pd)2p(0|µtη) , (55)
and C x2 =
[
1 − (1 − pd)p(0|µtη/2)
]2
. Having written
down all Bob’s parameters, we can move on to present
the class of attacks by Eve that we consider.
C. Eve’s attacks: hypotheses, information and
constraints
1. Overview of the hypotheses
Some of the hypotheses on Eve’s attacks have been
rapidly introduced in the previous paragraphs. Here we
make the exhaustive list of the assumptions.
Hypothesis 1: Eve performs incoherent attacks: she at-
tacks each pulse individually, and measures her quantum
systems just after the sifting phase. This hypothesis al-
lows to perform explicit calculations of an upper bound
for the secret key rate. We shall say more on these at-
tacks in the next paragraph (IVC2). The hypothesis of
incoherent attacks implies in particular that after sift-
ing, Alice, Bob and Eve share several independent re-
alizations of a random variable distributed according to
a classical probability law. Under this assumption and
the assumption of one-way error correction and privacy
amplification, the Csiszar-Ko¨rner bound applies [19] and
the achievable secret key rate is given by (29) [24].
Hypothesis 2: Eve can replace the actual channel with
a lossless channel. This allows her to take advantage
of the losses: she can block pulses on which she has
poor or no information, keep some photons out of multi-
photon pulses, etc. Because of Eve’s intervention, the
pulses which reach Bob obey the statistics pB|E(n) a pri-
ori different from the expected one (40). The most gen-
eral assumption would consist in leaving pB|E(n) com-
pletely free, and estimate Eve’s information from it.
The most conservative assumption consists in requiring
pB|E(n) = pB(n) for all n, and aborting the protocol
if this requirement is not fulfilled; this is the spirit of
decoy-state protocols [6]. In this paper, we choose an in-
termediate requirement: we constrain Eve to reproduce
the expected count rates C xacc, C
x
2 and the rate of no
detection (note that the rate of inconclusive detections
will be reproduced as well). This assumption is consis-
tent with the idea of introducing no modification in the
hardware: without allowing for decoy states and/or more
detectors, these rates are the only parameters which can
be measured. Eve has also a constraint on C zacc and C
z
2 ,
though of a different nature: these two quantities must
depend on a single parameter V according to Eqs (45)
and (55).
Hypothesis 3: We work in the trusted-device scenario.
While the optical error D in the quantum channel (the
imperfect visibility) is entirely attributed to Eve’s inter-
vention, we assume that Eve has no access to Bob’s de-
tector: η and pd are given parameters for both Bob and
Eve. Eve will of course adapt her strategy to the value
of these parameters, but she cannot modify them [25].
2. More on the class of attacks
In Hypothesis 1, we have explained that we restrict to
incoherent attacks. Here is a detailed description of Eve’s
strategy. Eve, located immediately outside Alice’s sta-
tion, makes a non-demolition measurement of the num-
ber of photons n in each pulse. This does not introduce
any error because ρA (37) is diagonal in the Fock basis.
Based on this information, Eve implements an attack K
with probability pK(n), so that the channel Alice-Bob is
of the form
ρB = E [ρA] =
∑
n
pA(n)
∑
K|n
pK(n) EK[|nψ〉〈nψ|] . (56)
These are the attacks that we investigate:
S: Storage attack : if n ≥ 2, Eve can choose to store k <
n photons, while forwarding the remaining n − k
photons to Bob on the lossless line. When Alice re-
veals the states, Eve makes the measurement that
maximizes her information, thus guessing Alice’s
bit correctly with probability pk =
1
2 +
1
2
√
1− 1
2k
.
This is the original type of PNS attack [5]. After
Alice’s possible preprocessing (bit flip with prob-
ability q), Eve’s guess is correct with probability
p′k = (1 − q)pk + q(1 − pk); whence Eve’s informa-
tion becomes
IS(k) = 1− h(p′k) (57)
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conditioned on Bob’s accepting the item. We de-
note by s(k|n) the probability that Eve, having cho-
sen to perform a storage attack, stores exactly k
photons.
I: Intercept-Resend attack : if n ≥ 3, the four states
|ψ〉⊗n, with |ψ〉 = | ± z〉 or | ± x〉, become linearly
independent. Eve can then perform an unambigu-
ous discrimination of the sent state, whose proba-
bility of success is
pok(n) = 1−
(
1
2
)⌊(n−1)/2⌋
(58)
(for n > 3, this is a numerical result [8]). In case of
success, Eve has full information about the bit and
she forwards m new photons to Bob prepared in
the state |ψ〉 (any value m is chosen with probabil-
ity r(m|n)). Otherwise, she blocks the item. Note
that this strategy, contrary to the storage attack,
requires neither a quantum memory (obviously) nor
a lossless line: having succeeded unambiguous dis-
crimination, Eve have the new photons prepared
by an accomplice of hers who is close to Bob’s lab.
This form of PNS attack has been first discussed by
Dusˇek and coworkers [26]. After Alice’s preprocess-
ing, Eve’s information in case of success becomes
II(n) ≡ II = 1− h(q) (59)
again conditioned on Bob’s accepting the item.
U: Unitary interaction: Both the S and the I attacks
provide Eve with information only thanks to the
losses, and don’t introduce any error in Alice-Bob
correlations (V = 1). If there is a reduced visibility
V = 1 − ε, Eve can also take advantage of it by
performing an attack which introduces some errors
(and no losses). Noting that information on pulses
with n ≥ 2 can be obtained using S or (for n ≥ 3)
I, we suppose that errors will be introduced only to
gain information about n = 1 items. Moreover, as
mentioned above, ε is typically quite small: instead
of tackling the very hard problem of optimizing this
family of attack, for simplicity we choose a repre-
sentative, namely the attack developed in section
III C. As described there, she obtains an informa-
tion
IU(D˜) = 1−
∑
e
pE=eh(pA′=0|E=e) . (60)
The important point to stress is that in the unitary
operation U one must insert a value D˜ = 12 (1− V˜ )
which is in general larger than the average error D
(in other words, V˜ ≤ V ). This is because Eve in-
troduces only errors in a fraction of the pulses, so
in those items she can introduce more perturbation
than the average [27].
B: Eve blocks all the n photons. In this case of course,
Bob receives nothing and can accept the item only
in the case of a dark count. On the one hand, Eve
is willing to block a pulse only when she has small
or no information on it (typically, one- and two-
photon pulses). On the other hand, Alice and Bob
will always choose µ such that Eve will not be able
to block all single- and two-photon pulses without
changing Bob’s expected detection rate. Therefore,
we set
pB(n) = 0 for n ≥ 3 . (61)
L: Finally, Eve may be forced to let all the photons in
the pulse go to Bob in order to preserve the count-
ing rates. In this case, Bob may accept the item
but Eve doesn’t get any information on Alice’s bit.
However, we shall consider
pL(n) = 0 for all n . (62)
The reason is as follows. For n = 1, Eve applies
the U strategy which does not reduce the counting
rates and gives her some information (for V = 1,
the U strategy with a disturbance D˜ = 0 is equiv-
alent to pL(1)). For n > 1, when losses are large
enough, that is at not too short distances, condition
(62) is obviously part of the best strategy for Eve.
So, the only effect of this condition is to prevent
us from studying SARG04 at short distances (for
the values of the parameters used below, in par-
ticular for η = 0.1, the shortest distance at which
constraints can be satisfied is found to be ∼ 24 km).
Note that, for the qubit encoding, the channel (56) be-
haves as a depolarizing channel. In fact, attacks S and
I don’t introduce any error, and attack U was shown in
III C to induce a depolarizing channel between Alice and
Bob.
A comment is needed about the exhaustiveness of our
list of attacks. We have stressed enough that U is not
optimized. The list of zero-error attacks, on the contrary,
is fairly complete among the incoherent PNS attacks for
the analysis of SARG04 [28]. One may well construct
more general strategies: e.g., for n = 5, Eve may try I on
three photons, and if she does not succeed, she performs
S on the remaining two. However, the mean number of
photons µ will be chosen small enough, so that the mean-
ingful items are those with n ≤ 3, n = 4 items playing
the role of small correction and all the higher-number
items being completely negligible.
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3. Eve’s information and constraints
We are now able to write down formulae for I(A′ : E)
and for the constraints which Eve must fulfill. For each
n, Eve uses strategy X with probability pX(n), so that
it holds
n = 1 : pB(1) + pU(1) = 1 , (63)
n = 2 : pB(2) + pS(2) = 1 (64)
n ≥ 3 : pS(n) + pI(n) = 1 . (65)
Under this family of attacks, Eve’s information on Alice’s
bits after sifting and preprocessing is
I(A′ : E) = pA(1)pU(1)IU(D˜)pacc(1, V˜ )
+
∑
n≥2
pA(n)
[
pS(n)
n−1∑
k=1
s(k|n)IS(k)pacc(n− k, 1)
+pI(n)pok(n) II
∑
m≥1
r(m|n)pacc(m, 1)
]
(66)
where the pacc(n, V ) are given in (47).
Eve is going to choose her parameters in order to max-
imize I(A′ : E), under the constraints described in Hy-
pothesis 2. To write down these constraints, one first
notes that the number of photons that reach Bob is dis-
tributed according to
pB|E(n > 0) = δn,1 pA(1)pU(1)
+
∑
m>n
pA(m)pS(m)s(m− n|m)
+
∑
m≥3
pA(m)pI(m)pok(m)r(n|m) , (67)
pB|E(n = 0) = 1−
∑
n>0
pB|E(n) . (68)
Of course, there is no reason for pB|E(n) to be Poisso-
nian, even if pA(n) is. Now, according to Hypothesis 2,
Eve is constrained to fulfill∑
n
pB|E(n)p0(n) ≡
∑
n
pB(n)p0(n) (69)
∑
n
pB|E(n)p
x
acc(n) ≡
∑
n
pB(n)p
x
acc(n) (70)∑
n
pB|E(n)px2 (n) ≡
∑
n
pB(n)p
x
2 (n) (71)∑
n
pB|E(n)p zacc(n, 1) + q(1)
[
p zacc(1, V˜ )− p zacc(1, 1)
]
≡
∑
n
pB(n)p
z
acc(n, V ) (72)∑
n
pB|E(n)p z2 (n, 1) + q(1)
[
p z2 (1, V˜ )− p z2 (1, 1)
]
≡
∑
n
pB(n)p
z
2 (n, V ) (73)
with V the average visibility that Eve chooses to intro-
duce and q(1) = pA(1)pU(1) the only cases where Eve
introduces errors. Note that the value of V˜ is defined by
Eqs (72) and (73).
The five constraints (69)-(73) are actually not indepen-
dent and can be reduced to the following set (derivation
in Appendix D):
~PB|E · ~Γ(1) = ~PB · ~Γ(1) , (74)
~PB|E · ~Γ(1/2) = ~PB · ~Γ(1/2) , (75)
pA(1)pU(1) ηD˜ = ~PB ·
(
~Γ(F )− ~Γ(1)
)
(76)
where we have stored the probabilities pB(n) and pB|E(n)
in the vectors ~PB and ~PB|E and where the vectors ~Γ(x)
depend only on the detector’s efficiency η, their respec-
tive components being γn(x) = (1 − xη)n for all n ≥ 0.
In particular, the last condition (76) together with (63)
determines the error D˜ that Eve can introduce on all the
one-photon pulses that she does not block. As expected,
this relation reduces to D˜ = 0 in the case V = 1.
In the case where Alice holds a Poissonian source with
mean photon number µ, we have ~PB · ~Γ(x) = p(0|xµtη),
whence (74)-(76) read explicitly
~PB|E · ~Γ(1) = p(0|µtη) , (77)
~PB|E · ~Γ(1/2) = p(0|µtη/2) , (78)
p(1|µ) pU(1) ηD˜ = p(0|µtηF )− p(0|µtη) . (79)
D. Optimization over Eve’s strategy and Alice’s
parameters
We have at present collected all the pieces which are
needed for our study. For any fixed value of µ and q,
Eve is going to choose her parameters pX(n), s(k|n) and
r(m|n) in order to maximize I(A′ : E) [Eq. (66)] under
the constraints (77)-(79). Alice and Bob must choose µ
and q in order to maximize Rsk [Eq. (29)], with I(A
′ : B)
given in Eq. (52) and with I(A′ : E) computed as just
described. This double optimization will be done numer-
ically; for the case V = 1, we shall also provide some
analytical approximations, both as a consistency check
for the numerics and as a tool for practical estimates.
1. Restricting the number of free parameters
Even in the perspective of using a computer, we have to
simplify the problem further: the number of free param-
eters is a priori infinite. In particular, we have to discuss
the probabilities s(k|n) and r(m|n) associated, respec-
tively, to the S and I attacks. These are related to the
number of photons that Eve forwards to Bob. We first
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notice that the constraints (77) and (78) can be satisfied
up to the order O(µtη)3 by setting
pB|E(1) = µt− (µt)2 (80)
pB|E(2) =
1
2
(µt)2 (81)
and all the others pB|E(n > 2) = 0; that is, for each item,
Eve forwards either one or two photons to Bob. We con-
sider that Eve forwards two photons only after some I
attacks, because this does not cost her any information;
whereas, would she forward two photons in a S attack,
fewer photons would be left in her quantum memory to
estimate the state. When Eve performs the I attack on
a 3-photon pulse, she can forward either one or two pho-
tons; when she performs it on a higher-n pulse, she always
forwards two photons. In conclusion, we assume
s(k|n) = δk,n−1 for all n , (82)
r(2|3) = 1− r(1|3) , (83)
r(m|n) = δ2,m for all n ≥ 4 . (84)
Summarizing, the free parameters for Eve’s attack are{
pU(1), pS(2), pS(3), pI(3, 2), pS(4), ..., pS(nmax)
}
(85)
where pI(3, 2) = pI(3)r(2|3) and nmax is a cutoff in the
number of photons allowed in a pulse — we have chosen
nmax = 7 in what follows, although a posteriori we veri-
fied that nmax = 5 would have given the same results but
for the shortest distances that we considered. This choice
of free parameters, in particular the choice of pI(3, 2) in-
stead of r(2|3), is useful because all the constraints (80),
(81) and (79) become linear in the parameters; of course,
one must add a fourth linear constraint, namely
pS(2) + pI(3, 2) ≤ 1 . (86)
Maximization of a function (here, Eve’s information) un-
der a set of linear constraints is achieved in Matlab with
the pre-defined function fmincon. At this point, we can
run our numerical optimization of µ as a function of the
distance.
2. Results, part 1: Eve’s parameters
We have run our software with the following parame-
ters: α = 0.25, η = 0.1, pd = 10
−5. These are not the
very best values that we can achieve in the laboratory,
but we have already used them many times and it will
be useful for comparison, especially with Ref. [15]. The
numerical simulation achieves a faithful result only for
d >∼ 24 km, because of Eq. (62), and for V >∼ 0.92 (recall
that for V <∼ 0.825 the secret key rate becomes zero even
in a single-photon implementation; it is then not aston-
ishing that the visibility becomes more critical when Eve
can take advantage also of multi-photon pulses). Here
is what is observed for the optimal parameters of Eve’s
attack:
• n = 1: pU(1) is always zero for V = 1. This means
that in this case Eve blocks all the single-photon
pulses. For V < 1, it turns out that D˜ is con-
stant at the value D˜0 = 0.191 over all the distances
(more precisely, over all the distance for which the
best preprocessing by Alice consists in doing noth-
ing, which are all the region of interest as will be
explained later). The value of pU(1) is thus deter-
mined by (79).
• n = 2: pS(2) is between zero and one. This means
that Eve cannot block all the two-photon items.
• n = 3: pS(3) is zero, pI(3, 2) is between zero and
one. That is, when the pulse contains three pho-
tons, Eve performs always the I attack; sometimes
she sends out one photon and sometimes two. Ac-
tually, this rate of forwarding two photons is al-
ready enough to reproduce the constraint (81), as
is implied by the following item.
• n ≥ 4: pS(n) = 1: Eve performs always the S at-
tack.
Remarkably, most of the features of Eve’s optimal at-
tack can be re-derived analytically and the derivation is
independent of the form of the pA(n). This is expected,
because Eve first measures the number of photons n, then
adapts her strategy to her result; thus, the frequency of
occurrence of any value of n does not play any role in
defining her best attack for each n — although it will
of course determine the fraction of information that each
attack provides her. The price to pay for the analytical
approach is that, to avoid getting lost, one has better
neglect the constraint (81) on two photons. We present
this analytical derivation in Appendix E. In summary: a
numerical approach, which assumes a Poissonian distri-
bution for Alice’s source and can deal with the full set
of constraints, and an analytical one, in which the in-
dependence of the source’s statistics is explicit but the
constraints must be simplified, converge to the same re-
sult: we have indeed found Eve’s optimal attacks within
the class which we are considering, independently of the
statistics of Alice’s source — our assumptions on Eve’s
attacks are reasonable provided the source is such that
pA(1) > pA(2) > pA(3)...
3. Results, part 2: µ and Rsk
Having Eve’s best attack, we can compute for any dis-
tance the optimal value of µ and the corresponding upper
bound Rsk on the secret key rate. The results of numer-
ical optimization are shown in Fig. 3. Several points are
worth stressing:
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• We recall first that these results are valid for a large
but still restricted class of attacks by the eavesdrop-
per, according to the hypotheses described in IVC
and IVD1. Moreover, the curve for V = 0.95 de-
pends also on our choice of introducing a U attack
only on the n = 1 pulses. Thus, Rsk is an up-
per bound on the achievable secret key rate, which
remains to be computed.
• The optimal value of µ is above 0.1 for all the
range that we considered, both for V = 1 and
for V = 0.95; for d = 24km and V = 1 we have
µopt = 1.55. In contrast to the case of BB84 [15],
µ does not decrease faster to zero as the critical
distance approaches.
• Alice’s preprocessing is non-trivial (q > 0) only
in the critical region where the presence of dark
counts bends the curve below the linear (in log
scale) regime. In principle, one tends to avoid work-
ing in that region.
As in the case of Eve’s parameter, we complement
the numerical optimization with some analytical studies,
even at the price of some approximations: this is useful
both to legitimate the numerical result and to provide
formulae for rapid estimates. We consider µtη ≪ 1 and
obviously pd ≪ 1. We suppose that Eve forwards always
one photon to Bob, thus taking the one-photon constraint
(80) at the leading order and neglecting the two-photon
constraint (81); in addition, we restrict to the case V = 1,
whence constraint (79) is automatically satisfied, and we
neglect Alice’s preprocessing by setting q = 0. From the
study of Eve’s attack we know that we can set pU(1) = 0,
pS(3) = 0 and pS(n ≥ 4) = 1. For a Poissonian source
then
I(A : B) ≃
(
µtη
4
+ pd
) [
1− h(Q(µ))] , (87)
I(A : E) ≃ η
4
(
µtIS(1) +
1
2
p(3|µ)(1− IS(1))
+
∑
n≥4
p(n|µ)(IS(n− 1)− IS(1))
)
, (88)
with
Q(µ) =
1
2 + µtη2pd
(89)
These are non-algebraic functions, so the analytical max-
imization of Rsk is still impossible; but it is easily done
numerically. It yields a careful estimate of both µ and
Rsk in the typical working regime (40-70 km in Fig. 3),
diverges for shorter distances and underestimates the lim-
iting distance. Thus, in practice, one can use these two
equations to estimate the optimal parameters and to keep
away from the limiting distance.
In order to reach analytical approximate solutions to
the maximization problem, we further neglect the cor-
rection 1 − h(Q) in the expression of I(A : B) (i.e. we
suppose µtη ≫ pd), the contribution of the pulses with
n ≥ 4 photons in the expression of I(A : E), and the
factor e−µ in p(3|µ) — this last assumption is the worst
one, because we are dealing with µ >∼ 1 at short distance.
That leads to
Rsk ≈ η
4
(1− IS(1))
(
µt− µ
3
12
)
. (90)
The optimum is
Rsk ≈ η
3
(1− IS(1))t3/2 for µopt = 2
√
t. (91)
These values are plotted in Fig. 3 together with the re-
sult of the exact numerical optimization. We see that
the approximations are rough as expected but grasp the
correct order of magnitude. Finally note that, contrary
to the case of BB84 [15], we have not been able to find a
closed analytical expression for the limiting distance, the
difference here being that µ does not fall rapidly to zero
when approaching this distance.
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FIG. 3. (Color online) Optimal µ and upper bound Rsk
on the secret key rate per pulse (log scale) for Poissonian
sources as a function of the distance, for α = 0.25, η = 0.1
and pd = 10
−5, and for V = 1 and 0.95. The full thick lines
are the result of the numerical optimization, considering also
Alice’s preprocessing; the dashed thick lines are the same,
without Alice’s preprocessing (q = 0). The full thin lines are
the analytical approximations for V = 1, Eq. (91); the dashed
thin line in the upper figure is the critical value µ = 2
√
3t at
which Rsk = 0 according to the approximate formula (90).
E. Attenuated laser: Comparison with BB84
Finally, we compare the performances of the SARG04
and those of the BB84 under identical conditions, from
Ref. [15]. Since Alice’s preprocessing was not taken into
account in that work, for coherence we compare the re-
sults for q = 0 — it is not difficult to see that the con-
tribution of this preprocessing in BB84 is numerically
negligible, as it is for SARG04 [29].
The optimal µ and the upper bound Rsk on the se-
cret key rate are plotted in Fig. 4. We see that SARG04
allows an increase of the secret key rate at moderately
large distance and of the limiting distance. It seems that
BB84 achieves a better secret key rate at short distance.
Although we cannot make any final commitment because
we have made hypotheses that prevent us to study that
regime, one might understand it from the following argu-
ment: at short distance, Eve can do essentially no PNS
attack for inefficient detectors; therefore, the sifting ra-
tio becomes the important parameter — now, in SARG04
only one quarter of the items are kept, while in BB84 half
of the items are kept.
The present analysis supersedes the one made in Refs
[7,8], which supposed a fixed value of µ for all distances.
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FIG. 4. (Color online) Optimal µ and upper bound Rsk
on the secret key rate per pulse (log scale) for Poissonian
sources as a function of the distance, for α = 0.25, η = 0.1
and pd = 10
−5, and for V = 1, 0.95. Thick lines: SARG04
(identical to Fig. 3, with q = 0); thin lines: BB84, under the
same conditions.
V. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, we have studied the SARG04 protocol
for two different types of source of light on Alice’s side.
For the implementation using single-photon sources,
we have obtained a lower and an upper bound for security
against all possible attacks by the eavesdropper. These
bounds are close to those obtained for the BB84 proto-
col. However, if a channel of a given visibility is available,
then the QBER of SARG04 is twice the QBER of BB84.
Interestingly, the upper bound for SARG04 was obtained
for an incoherent attack based on a unitary which is not
the phase-covariant quantum cloner.
For the realistic implementation using an attenuated
laser (Poissonian source), we have restricted the class
of Eve’s attacks to incoherent attacks, in particular the
most studied forms of PNS attacks. In this case, SARG04
performs better than BB84, both in the achievable secret
key rate and in the limiting distance.
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These results strengthen the conclusion of Refs [7,8,30]:
once quantum correlations have been distributed, differ-
ent ways of encoding and decoding the classical infor-
mation lead to different performances according to the
physical characteristics of the setup. The full potentiali-
ties of this insight have still to be developed.
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APPENDIX A
In this appendix we give more details about the calcu-
lation of the lower bound. The following is not specific
to the SARG04 protocol, but can be applied to any pro-
tocol. As discussed in III B, in order to compute a lower
bound on the secret key rate, we can consider the state
that Alice and Bob share before the preprocessing to be
of the form (10), which we rewrite here:
ρ2 = λ1PΦ+ + λ2PΦ− + λ3PΨ+ + λ4PΨ− . (A1)
Eve holds a system which makes a purification of ρ2:
|χ〉ABE =
√
λ1|Φ+〉AB|00〉E +
√
λ2|Φ−〉AB|01〉E
+
√
λ3|Ψ+〉AB|10〉E +
√
λ4|Ψ−〉AB|11〉E (A2)
Eve’s and Bob’s partial states are respectively:
ρE = diag(λ1, λ2, λ3, λ4) , ρB =
1
2
1 (A3)
whence S(ρE) = −
∑
i λi logλi and S(ρB) = 1.
When Alice has measured |0〉 or |1〉, Bob and Eve share
one of the states :
|χ0〉BE ∝ A〈0|χ〉ABE
= |0〉B(
√
λ1|00〉+
√
λ2|01〉)E
+|1〉B(
√
λ3|10〉+
√
λ4|11〉)E (A4)
|χ1〉BE ∝ A〈1|χ〉ABE
= |0〉B(
√
λ3|10〉 −
√
λ4|11〉)E
+|1〉B(
√
λ1|00〉 −
√
λ2|01〉)E , (A5)
which give in the computational bases
ρ0E =


λ1
√
λ1λ2√
λ1λ2 λ2
λ3
√
λ3λ4√
λ3λ4 λ4

 , (A6)
ρ1E =


λ1 −
√
λ1λ2
−√λ1λ2 λ2
λ3 −
√
λ3λ4
−√λ3λ4 λ4

 , (A7)
and
ρ0B =
(
λ1 + λ2
λ3 + λ4
)
=
(
1−Q
Q
)
, (A8)
ρ1B =
(
λ3 + λ4
λ1 + λ2
)
=
(
Q
1−Q
)
. (A9)
If q = pA′ 6=A denotes the probability for Alice to flip her
bit (preprocessing), the state of Alice and Eve is
ρA′E =
1
2
[(
(1 − q)|0〉〈0| + q|1〉〈1|)⊗ ρ0E
+
(
q|0〉〈0| + (1− q)|1〉〈1|)⊗ ρ1E]
=
1
2
|0〉〈0| ⊗ σ0E +
1
2
|1〉〈1| ⊗ σ1E , (A10)
where σ0E = (1− q)ρ0E + qρ1E and σ1E = qρ0E + (1− q)ρ1E .
Then,
S(ρA′E) = 1 +
1
2
S(σ0E) +
1
2
S(σ1E). (A11)
With similar notations,
S(ρA′B) = 1 +
1
2
S(σ0B) +
1
2
S(σ1B) . (A12)
Finally,
R(σA′BE) = S(ρA′E)− S(ρE)−
[
S(ρA′B)− S(ρB)
]
=
1
2
[
S(σ0E) + S(σ
1
E)− S(σ0B)− S(σ1B)
]
+1− S(ρE) . (A13)
This is the function which must be optimized over the λi
compatible with the constraints (which define the proto-
col) and over the bit-wise preprocessing:
r1 = sup
q∈[0,0.5[
inf
λ′s
R(σA′BE) . (A14)
APPENDIX B
In the main text, we have computed the lower bound
for the SARG04 protocol implemented with single-
photon sources. One might ask what happens if the
SARG04 protocol is modified if only two ”opposite” sift-
ing sets, say S++ and S−−, are used instead of all the
four.
The interest of the two-sets protocol is a practical one.
The sifting of the four-sets protocol requires Alice to use
a random bit for each item (for instance, if she has sent
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|+ z〉, she must still decide whether to announce S++ or
S+−). In a true implementation, the production of local
random bits is one of the most time-consuming tasks. In
the two-sets protocol, an easier sifting procedure can be
implemented: for instance, Bob reveals whether he has
got a detection in the ”+” or in the ”−” detector. If Al-
ice has sent a state in S++ (S−−), the detection in ”−”
(”+”) is conclusive: then, Alice tells Bob whether the
bit is accepted or discarded. Obviously, no random bit is
needed for such a sifting.
The intuition based on incoherent attacks suggests that
the two- and the four-sets protocols are equivalent: after
all, Eve has to distinguish among the same four states be-
fore sifting takes place; and after sifting, her knowledge
is the same in both protocols. While this equivalence
probably holds indeed, the lower bound computed with
our method is slightly less favorable in the two-sets case.
In fact, one finds after some algebra
λ1 = C˜ 〈Φ+|ρ0|Φ+〉
λ2 = C˜
[〈Ψ−|ρ0|Ψ−〉+ 2〈χ−|ρ0|χ−〉]
λ3 = C˜ 〈χ+|ρ0|χ+〉
λ4 = C˜
[
2〈Ψ−|ρ0|Ψ−〉+ 〈χ−|ρ0|χ−〉
] (B1)
where |χ±〉 = 1√
2
(|Φ−〉 ± |Ψ+〉) and C˜ = C2 with C
defined in Eq. (9). Note that C is not the same as in
(13); also, the structure of (13) would be recovered if
we’d replace the states |χ±〉 by the incoherent mixture
1
2 |Φ−〉〈Φ−|+ 12 |Ψ+〉〈Ψ+|.
The constraints imposed by (B1) are less tight than
those imposed by (13): actually, λ1 and λ3 are uncon-
strained but for (12). For λ2 and λ4, it is easy to see
that λ2− 2λ4 = −3C˜〈Ψ−|ρ0|Ψ−〉 ≤ 0 and symmetrically
λ4 − 2λ2 = −3C˜〈χ−|ρ0|χ−〉 ≤ 0, whence
λ2
2
≤ λ4 ≤ min (2λ2, Q) . (B2)
Using this constraint, the optimization of r1 gives a lower
bound Q ≤ 8.90% (Q ≤ 7.74% if we’d have neglected
preprocessing). Thus, the lower bound obtained for the
two-sets protocol is worse than the one found for the orig-
inal four-sets protocol. This is not a conclusive proof of
inequivalence, in so far as we don’t know whether each
bound is tight.
APPENDIX C
The calculations leading to the expression of Eve’s in-
formation (27) plotted in Fig. 1 can be done analytically
up to some extent. The three eigenvalues of MA are
λ± = ± 2
√
D(2−3D)
1+2D and λ0 = 0, whence the natural
labelling for the index e of the main text is
e ∈ {0,+,−} . (C1)
In the basis where |00〉 ≡ eˆ1, |01〉 ≡ eˆ2 and |10〉 ≡ eˆ3,
and with α± =
√
D±√2−3D√
1−2D , the corresponding normal-
ized eigenvectors are
|m±〉 = 1
1 + 12α
2±

 α±1
− 12α2±

 ,
|m0〉 = 1√
2− 3D


√
D√
1− 2D√
1− 2D

 .
One sees that the calculation is heavy, and since the func-
tion (27) is not algebraic, ultimately one must make use
of the computer; that is why these analytical results are
of limited utility. Still, we can use them to obtain more
insight on Helstrom’s strategy. In fact, the general calcu-
lation scheme described in the main text can be described
as follows:
• When Eve finds the positive eigenvalue λ+, she
guesses Alice’s bit to be 0 (see the definition of
MA); when she finds the negative eigenvalue λ−,
she guesses Alice’s bit to be 1. These two cases
appear with the same probability (pE=+ = pE=−)
and Eve’s guess is correct with the same probability
pguess = pA=0|E=+ = pA=1|E=−.
• With probability pE=0, Eve finds the eigenvalue
λ0, from which she cannot draw any conclu-
sion. Indeed, it is the case: 〈m0|MA|m0〉 = 0
implies 〈m0|ρA=0E |m0〉 = 〈m0|ρA=1E |m0〉, whence
pE=0|A=0 = pE=0|A=1 = pE=0. Consequently, us-
ing Bayes’ rule (28), we find pA=0|E=0 = 12 .
Following these remarks, Eve’s information (27) can be
rewritten as:
I(A : E) = (1− pE=0)(1 − h(pguess)) . (C2)
APPENDIX D
In this Appendix we show how the five constraints (69)-
(73) reduce to the three conditions (74)-(76), as claimed
in IVC3.
Using the expression (43) for p0(n), we can rewrite the
first constraint (69) as∑
n
pB|E(n)(1− η)n ≡
∑
n
pB(n)(1 − η)n (D1)
which is (74). By replacing the expression (46) for pxacc(n)
into (70), we find that this second constraint is satisfied
by adding to (D1) the condition∑
n
pB|E(n)(1 − η/2)n ≡
∑
n
pB(n)(1 − η/2)n (D2)
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which is (75). Finally, because of (54), the third con-
straint (71) is automatically satisfied if the first two
are. In summary, the first three constraints (69)-(71)
are equivalent to the two conditions (74) and (75).
Consider now constraint (72). From (44), we have
p zacc(n, 1) = pd(1− pd)(1− η)n for all n , (D3)
p zacc(1, V˜ ) = (1− pd)ηD˜ + p zacc(1, 1) , (D4)
whence the l.h.s. of (72), up to the factor (1− pd), reads
pA(1)pU(1)ηD˜ + pd ~PB|E · ~Γ(1) .
Using again (44), the r.h.s. of (72), up to the factor
(1− pd), reads∑
n
pB(n) [(1− Fη)n − (1− η)n] + pd ~PB · ~Γ(1) .
Since we have already imposed (74), equality of these two
expressions is obtained if and only if (76) holds.
Finally, we have to discuss (73). From (53) we note
that p z2 (1, V ) is actually independent of V because this
parameter appears in the combination F + D = 1. In
particular, p z2 (1, V˜ ) = p
z
2 (1, 1) whence the l.h.s. of (73)
becomes
1− (1− pd)[1 + ~PB|E · ~Γ(1)] + (1− pd)2 ~PB|E · ~Γ(1) ,
which is entirely determined by (74) and is independent
of V˜ . However, the r.h.s. of (73) does depend on V .
Consequently, for the strategies that we have considered,
constraint (73) is automatically satisfied by (74) if V = 1
and cannot be satisfied exactly if V < 1. In this last case
however, the discrepancy is rather small. In fact
p z2 (n, V ) = p
z
2 (n, 1) + nηD(1− (1− η)n−1) +O(ηD)2
and the leading term in the discrepancy will be the one
associated to n = 2, that is
pB|E(2) |p z2 (2, V )− p z2 (2, 1)| ≈ pB|E(2) 2η2D . (D5)
Specifically, for a Poissonian source the discrepancy is
|C z2 (V )− C z2 (1)| i.e. using (55)
[p(0|x) + 1]− [p(0|xF ) + p(0|xD)] = FDx2 +O(x3)
with x = µtη, consistent with (D5) using (81). Since
typical values are η ≈ 0.1 and D <∼ 1%, this discrepancy
is small. Thus, we can assume that (73) is satisfied as
well, and we have proved that the constraints (69)-(73)
reduce to (74)-(76) as claimed.
APPENDIX E
In this Appendix, we re-derive the results on the opti-
mal parameters for Eve’s attack that have been obtained
by numerical optimization, see IVD 2. As we said there,
we work in a more restricted setting, by neglecting the
possibility of double counts: Eve forwards always one
photon (if any) to Bob, that is s(m|n) = r(m|n) = δm,1
for all n. We also neglect Alice’s preprocessing, which
makes very minor modifications in the end (i.e., q = 0).
However, we do not assume that Alice’s source is Poisso-
nian.
We study the constraints first. Since Eve forwards only
one photon to Bob, pB|E(n > 1) = 0 and pB|E(0) =
1 − pB|E(1). Constraint (75) cannot be satisfied, but at
long distance this is supposed to be a very small con-
tribution. Constraint (74) reads pB|E(1) = C where
C = [~PB · ~Γ(1)− 1]/η depends only on parameters which
are outside Eve’s control; and
pB|E(1) = pA(1)pU(1) + pA(2)pS(2)
+
∑
n≥3
pA(n)
[
pS(n) + pI(n)pok(n)
]
.
The constraint (76) is of the form pA(1)pU(1) = (1/D˜)C
′
where C′ = ~PB · [~Γ(F )−~Γ(1)]/η depends only on param-
eters which are outside Eve’s control. Using these two
constraints, we can express pA(1)pU(1) and pA(2)pS(2)
as a function of the other parameters. The quantity that
Eve must optimize (66) reads now
I(A : E) = pA(1)pU(1)IU(D˜) ξ˜ + pA(2)pS(2)IS(1)ξ
+
∑
n≥3
pA(n)
[
pS(n)IS(n− 1) + pI(n)pok(n)
]
ξ =
= ξ
{
C′K(D˜) +
∑
n≥3
pA(n)pS(n)L(n)
+C IS(1) +
∑
n≥3
pA(n)pok(n) (1− IS(1))
}
(E1)
where we have defined ξ˜ = pacc(1, V˜ ),ξ = pacc(1, 1) and
K(D˜) =
1
D˜
( ξ˜
ξ
IU(D˜)− IS(1)
)
(E2)
L(n) = IS(n− 1)− IS(1)− pok(n) (1− IS(1)) (E3)
In writing (E1) we made explicit use of the constraints
and of pI(n) = 1 − pS(n) for n ≥ 3. The problem of
finding Eve’s best attack is thus reduced to the study of
K(D˜) and of L(n) for all n. These functions are inde-
pendent of the statistics pA(n) of Alice’s source.
The function K(D˜) depends only on one free param-
eter, D˜, and is independent of the distance. Therefore,
Eve will maximize her information by introducing always
the same amount of error D˜0, the one which maximizes
K(D˜). If we insert η = 0.1 and pd = 10
−5 in ξ˜/ξ, the
maximum is obtained for D˜0 ≃ 0.191, which is exactly
the value found by the numerical optimization.
The study of the L(n) is just as easy. In fact, by us-
ing the explicit expressions (57) for IS(n) and (58) for
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pok(n), one sees that L(3) ≃ −0.054 while L(n) > 0 for
n ≥ 4. Thence Eve’s information (E1) is maximized by
the choice pS(3) = 0 and pS(n ≥ 4) = 1: Eve performs
always the I attack when n = 3 and the S attack when
n ≥ 4. Again, this is exactly what has been found in the
numerical optimization.
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